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Abstract
The evaluation of scientific output has a key role in the allocation of research
funds and academic positions. Decisions are often based on quality indicators
for academic journals and over the years a handful of scoring methods have
been proposed for this purpose. Discussing the most prominent methods (de
facto standards) we show that they do not distinguish quality from quantity at
article level. The systematic bias we find is analytically tractable and implies
that the methods are manipulable. We introduce modified methods that cor-
rect for this bias, and use them to provide rankings of economic journals. Our
methodology is transparent; our results are replicable.
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1 Introduction
The last decades saw an explosion in the number of academic journals. Researchers
find it more and more difficult to keep up with the growing literature even in narrow
fields. Libraries face higher subscription fees and must allocate budgets in an efficient
way. Promotion decisions are often taken based on researchers’ publications. National
organizations for scientific research steer the course of science by funding proposals
based on their potential and on the publication record of the applicants. However,
the quality of the publications, approximated by the containing journals’ quality
indicator, is becoming increasingly difficult to evaluate and compare. Consequently,
there is a growing interest in finding measures, both cardinal and ordinal, that would
allow for an objective assessment. To this end, various scoring methods and ranking
rules have been devised. The former capture the cardinal aspect, by giving scores to
each journal, and the latter capture the ordinal aspect, by establishing an order of
preference among the journals.
Loosely speaking, a scoring (or ranking) problem can be thought of as a social
choice problem where a social welfare function is used to obtain total preorders on
the set of alternatives, with the additional requirement that the set of agents and
the set of alternatives coincide.1 That is, journals are asked to express their opinions
about each other and themselves. Citations made by a journal are considered to be
votes about the importance of the destination journal and a scoring method is used
to aggregate the information and determine a score for each journal. Each scoring
method induces a ranking rule.
In practice, the predominant scoring methods used for the measurement of intel-
lectual influence are the impact factor (Garfield, 1955), the LP method (Liebowitz
and Palmer, 1984; Laband and Piette, 1994), and the invariant method (Pinski and
Narin, 1976). The last two methods generated many variations of great practical im-
portance. The best known is the PageRank algorithm (Brin and Page, 1998), which
is at the core of how search engines rank web pages. Another variation is known as
the DeGroot (1974) model, which is used in models of learning in social and commu-
nication networks (Golub and Jackson, 2010), physics, and computer science (Sobel,
2000).
Despite their extensive usage, these methods have only been intuitively motivated,
if at all. We are familiar with two notable exceptions which present characterizations.
Given the invariant method, Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) find a set of cardinal
properties that fully characterize it. Given the PageRank algorithm, Altman and
Tennenholtz (2005) find a set of ordinal properties that fully characterize it.
This paper complements the efforts made towards a better understanding of scor-
ing methods from a normative perspective. While we do not derive a characterization
1Note that despite the fact that the models are closely related, they lead to very different results:
for example, Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2009, Proposition 9.5.1) show that Arrow’s impossibility
result holds exclusively in a social choice setting.
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of any scoring method, we formalize a property that we call invariance to article-
splitting, and with Theorem 1 we show that the impact factor, the LP method, and
the invariant method do not satisfy it.2 Our result implies that there is a system-
atic bias common to all methods favoring journals with fewer articles (or pages, or
characters). While invariance to article-splitting is a cardinal property, we show with
Example 2 that if the valuations are sufficiently biased they affect the induced ordinal
ranking. For the classification of academic journals, this bias against article-splitting
has several implications: First, whether we control for sheer size using the number
of pages or the number of articles has a profound effect on the classification results;
Second, we find that quality and quantity are indistinguishable at article level; Third,
it is a direct consequence of our results that the scoring methods presented are manip-
ulable, and we suggest how in principle publishers or editors could artificially boost
the scores of their journals. We also discuss how our findings can reach beyond the
journal setting, to settings of great practical importance like the classification of web
domains.
We then introduce modifications of all scoring methods, that are novel in the sense
that we interpret a journal as an intermediary that adds value when converting inputs
into outputs. These modifications also allow us to restore the desirable invariance to
article splitting.
In the second part of this paper, using our modified method, we provide scores
and rankings for economic journals that reflect the current trends in the influence of
economic journals.
2 Scoring Methods
Let J = {1, ..., n} denote a non-empty finite set of journals. For each i, j ∈ J , cij
represents the number of citations to journal i by journal j, that is, the number of
references made by journal j to journal i. Let us consider a n×n nonnegative citation
matrix C = {cij}i,j∈J . Let cj =
∑
i∈J cij denote the total number of citations made
by j and let DC denote the diagonal matrix with the elements in {cj}j∈J along the
diagonal. Let the entries of the nonnegative vector a denote the number of articles
in each journal and let A be the diagonal matrix with the elements in {aj}j∈J along
the diagonal. For each vector z ∈ Rn, we denote the 1-norm of z by ||z|| =∑ni=1 |zi|.
Definition 1. A scoring problem is a triple (J, a, C) consisting of a finite set of
journals J , a vector a ∈ Nn containing the number of published articles and a citation
matrix C = {cij}i,j∈J .
Let S denote the set of scoring problems. The score for each journal in J is given
2Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) were the first to introduce invariance properties for scoring
methods. However, their properties are not directly related to ours: In Step 3 of Theorem 1 we show
that the invariant method, which they characterize, does not satisfy invariance to article-splitting.
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by the transposed valuations vector vT = (v1, v2, ..., vn), where vi is interpreted as the
value of a representative article in journal i.
Definition 2. A scoring method φ maps a scoring problem (J, a, C) ∈ S to a unique
valuations vector v ∈ Rn.
A scoring method induces a weak ordering of the journals via the ranking rule
i < j if and only if for all i, j ∈ J , vi ≥ vj. Ties, i.e., i < j and j < i, are allowed,
but only occur if vi = vj.
The impact factor (Garfield, 1955) considers all citations received by an article to
have the same value and measures the direct influence that a typical article in journal
i has on all journals.
Definition 3. The impact factor gives valuations according to v that solves
A−1Ce = v (1)
where e is a vector of ones of dimension J and the matrices A and C contain data
for a two-year period.
The next two scoring methods assign different values to citations received based on
the importance of the journal that made the citation. The importance of each journal
is established endogenously and simultaneously for all journals in each method, using
convergent iterative procedures. Roughly speaking, the LP method (Liebowitz and
Palmer, 1984) gives valuations that reflect the influence that a typical article in journal
i has on journal j. The invariant method (Pinski and Narin, 1976) is a modification
of the LP method such that the valuations given are also weighted by the reference
intensity (i.e., the average number of citations made by a typical article in j).
For a formal presentation, we need an additional assumption and some extra nota-
tion. We require the citation matrix C to be primitive3: there should be no partition
of the set of journals J in two sets J1 and J2 such that i) there are no inter partition
citations or ii) all inter partition citations are unidirectional, say from journals in J2
to journals in J1, and we should have at least one self-citing journal. This is a very
natural and plausible assumption for classifying journals within the same field, and
from a technical perspective it ensures that the following scoring methods are well
defined. Under this assumption the iterative procedures defining the following two
methods are known to converge. We do not follow Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004)
in requiring the citation matrix to be only non-negative and irreducible because Ex-
ample 1 in Golub and Jackson (2010) shows that alone, these two assumptions do
not guarantee convergence. Next, we give directly the steady-state equations.
3It is well known that a sufficient condition for a matrix to be primitive is to be nonnegative and
irreducible with at least a positive element on the main diagonal.
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Definition 4. The LP method gives valuations according to v that solves
A−1Cv
||A−1Cv|| = v. (2)
Definition 5. The invariant method gives valuations according to v that solves
A−1CD−1C Av = v. (3)
Note that all of the scoring methods that we introduced yield a measure of the
intellectual influence per typical article published in a journal. However, there is a
considerable heterogeneity in the length of a typical article even for journals within
the same field. Some journals differ also in terms of page size. Applied studies4
correct for this by computing scores per page or per character, not per article.
3 Article-Splitting and Manipulability
In this section we introduce a basic desirable property of a scoring method: invariance
to article-splitting. To understand this property, consider the following example in
which the scoring methods yield the typical influence per page.
Example 1. (Invariance to article-splitting when scores are computed per page.)
Assume that the editorial board of a journal accepts a number of articles. Consider
two scenarios: i) the articles are published as such, or ii) for some of the articles
the authors are requested to shorten their length, by relegating inessential details to
the “web appendix”. The web appendix is available on-line but it is not part of the
printed journal, whose length is taken as input by the scoring methods. Observe that
scenario i) leads to a longer journal in terms of pages or characters than scenario ii),
and that the citations made (received) by an article are invariant between scenarios,
as typically there are no citations made (received) on inessential details. Invariance
to article-splitting requires the score of the journal to be the same in both scenarios.
Formally, let λj ∈ R, λj > 1, be a splitting factor and consider two ranking
problems {(J, a, C), (J, a′, C)} ⊆ S where for some journal j ∈ J , a′j = λjaj and for
all other journals i 6= j, a′i = ai. Let S = (J, a, C) and S ′ = (J, a′, C). For the two
problems S, S ′ ∈ S defined as above, S ′ is an article-split modification of S.
Definition 6. A scoring method φ is invariant to article-splitting if for any two
problems S, S ′ ∈ S such that S ′ is an article-split modification of S, φj(S) = φj(S ′).
Observe that the citation matrix is not affected: the number of citations does not
change, they are only distributed among more papers. Thus, when the scoring meth-
ods yield the typical influence of an article, our property can be thought of as relating
4See, for example, the studies of Kalaitzidakis et al (2003); Combes and Linnemer (2003); Coupe´
(2003).
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scoring problems in which: i) different journals have the same citation patterns but
publish a different numbers of articles, or ii) for the same journal, the number of
articles varies. The latter interpretation simply means that if k articles with no over-
lapping citation published in the same journal are merged into a single paper, then
the resulting publication collects all citations.
Next, we define a systematic deviation from invariance to article-splitting and
manipulability.
Definition 7. A scoring method φ is biased against article-splitting if for any two
problems S, S ′ ∈ S such that S ′ is an article-split modification of S, φj(S) > φj(S ′).
Definition 8. A scoring method φ is manipulable if a journal can increase its valu-
ation unilaterally.
Note that if a method is biased against article-splitting then it is manipulable.
Theorem 1. The impact factor, the LP method and the invariant method are biased
against article-splitting.
Proof. Let S, S ′ ∈ S be such that S ′ is an article-split modification of S. We now
proceed in several (independent) steps.
Step 1: The impact factor is biased against article-splitting.
Observe that v′j =
aj
a′j
vj =
1
λj
vj. Hence, v
′
j < vj, and for all i 6= j, v′i = vi. The result is
independent of the fact that the impact factor is calculated for a period of two years.
Step 2: The LP method is biased against article-splitting.
Adapting a technique introduced by Roy et al (2008), we show that an increase in the
number of articles of a journal decreases its valuation. Let Γ = A−1C and Γ′ = A′−1C.
Then, for S and S ′, the LP method gives valuations according to vectors v and v′
that solve the following equations:
Γv = ||Γv||v, (4)
Γ′v′ = ||Γ′v′||v′. (5)
Equations (4) and (5) are algebraic eigenvalue problems: %(Γ) = ||Γv|| is the
spectral radius of Γ and v the eigenvector associated with %(Γ), and %(Γ′) = ||Γ′v′||,
Γ′, v′ are similar. Since the matrix Γ is primitive, Γ′ is also primitive and (5) is well
defined. Since for all i ∈ J , a′i ≥ ai, Γ′ is weakly smaller in every entry than Γ.
Therefore, there exists δ > 0 such that:
%(Γ′) = %(Γ)− δ. (6)
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We scale v′ such that v′j = vj and rewrite v
′T as vT = vT − xT = [v1 − x1, ..., vj −
xj, ..., vn − xn] where x ∈ Rn such that xj = 0. By (5), Γ′v = %(Γ′)v. Replacing v,
%(Γ′) and using (4), we have:
Γ′v − Γ′x = %(Γ′)v − %(Γ′)x = %(Γ)v − δv − %(Γ′)x = Γv − δv − %(Γ′)x (7)
Let v−j, x−j ∈ R|J−{j}|, where vi, xi > 0, be the valuation vectors except for
journal j, and let Γ−j and Γ′−j be the matrices Γ and Γ
′ where we removed row and
column j. Note that Γ−j = Γ′−j. Dropping the j’th equation from the system of
Equations 7, we obtain5:
Γ−jx−j = δv−j + %(Γ′)x−j. (8)
Rearranging terms:
(%(Γ′)I − Γ−j)x−j = −δv−j. (9)
Define N =
Γ−j
%(Γ′) , and M = (I − N). Since Γ−j and %(Γ′) are nonnegative,
N is entrywise nonnegative, i.e., N ≥ 0. Marcus and Minc (1975) show that the
spectral radius of a primitive matrix is greater than the spectral radius of any of its
submatrices. Hence, %(Γ′) > %(Γ′−j) = %(Γ−j). Thus, the moduli of the eigenvalues
of N < 1, and consequently lim
t→∞
N t = 0. But:
I −Nk+1 = M(I +N +N2 + · · ·+Nk). (10)
Letting k → ∞, I = M∑k=∞k=0 Nk. Premultiplying by M−1, we have M−1 =∑k=∞
k=0 N
k. Since N ≥ 0, M−1 ≥ 0. Observing that in (9) the vector v−j is positive,
x−j has to be negative. Hence, vj = vj and for all i 6= j, vi > vi. Rescaling v to v′,
we have
v′j
v′i
<
vj
vi
. Since v′j = vj, for all i 6= j, v′i > vi.
Step 3: The invariant method is biased against article-splitting.
Observe that v′, defined as v′j =
1
λj
vj and v
′
i = vi for i 6= j, is the solution of:
A′−1CD−1C A
′v′ = v′. (11)
In order to see this, premultiply (3) by A, and (11) by A′. Then, note that A′v′ = Av.
Finally observe that as λj > 1, v
′
j < vj, while the valuations of other journals have
not changed.
Note that for the impact factor and for the invariant method the valuation of a
journal j whose articles are split into λj articles decreases by a factor of
1
λj
. For an
appropriate choice of λj, the decrease can be arbitrarily low. In particular, it can be
lower than the valuation of the journal ranked next, thus changing also the ranking of
5For clarity, we detail the calculations in Appendix C.
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the journals. Similarly, an increase in the number of articles of journal j decreases its
relative valuation given by the LP method, which may also affect journal j’s ranking.
The following example shows that the bias against article-splitting of the scoring
methods above may also induce changes in the ranking of the journals:
Example 2. (Article-splitting bias in scoring methods inducing changes in rankings).
Let J = {j1, j2, j3}, a = (2, 2, 3), a′ = (4, 2, 3) and define C as:
C =
 12 8 46 10 2
3 3 9

Let S = (J, a, C) and S ′ = (J, a′, C) be two ranking problems such that a′1 = λ1a1,
with λ1 = 2. For each problem, the following table presents the normalized vector of
valuations (so that the entries add up to 1) produced by each scoring method.
φIF (S) φIF (S
′) φIM(S) φIM(S ′) φLP (S) φLP (S)
j1 0.46 0.30 0.48 0.31 0.50 0.29
j2 0.35 0.45 0.33 0.44 0.37 0.51
j3 0.19 0.25 0.19 0.25 0.13 0.20
Note that all scoring methods induce the ranking j1  j2  j3 for S, and j2  j1  j3
for S ′.
Theorem 1 clearly indicates how to manipulate scoring methods. Should the
methods take as input the number of articles, then editors might opt to implement a
policy of publishing a small number of articles. If the number of pages (or characters)
is taken as input, then preference can be given to publishing briefer communications.
Recall Example 1. In principle, editors’ requests of discarding inessential details by
relegating them to the web appendix are desirable, as we don’t want to waste valuable
resources such as journal pages and reader’s time for irrelevant details. However, the
same requests might easily be abused to game the scoring methods. Interestingly,
essentially the same methods are used by search engines for obtaining the ranking of
web pages. The following example aims to clarify this analogy.
Example 3. (The ranking of web domains.)
A professor makes the following types of information available online: research, teach-
ing, and contact details. There are two natural options: i) to put all available infor-
mation on one page, each type in a separate section, or ii) to create one distinct web
page for each type.6 Search engines, like Google or Bing, use essentially the same
methods as the one used for the ranking of academic journals: their algorithm relies
on the LP-method where the left eigenvector is computed, i.e., the weight for each
6Note that this professor is only interested in the ranking of his domain and that the links that
his domain typically makes/receives are invariant in both cases.
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page is given by the components of vector v that solves vA
−1CT
||vA−1CT || = v, where each
entry cij in the transposed matrix C
T can be thought of as the number of links made
by domain i to domain j out of the total links made by i, and ai as the number of
web pages per domain.7 By Theorem 1, it is a dominant strategy for the professor
to aggregate all information on a single page. The same technique used in Step 2
of Theorem 1 can be easily adapted for the left eigenvector and leads to the same
qualitative conclusions.
More generally, owners of web domains have incentives to manipulate for economic
profit: a higher placement in Google results drives more internet traffic which in
turn yields higher sales or advertisement revenues. Reinterpreting Theorem 1 in this
context reveals that a domain owner can improve the score for his domain by jamming
all his data on a single omniscient sheet.
4 Modified Scoring Methods
All the methods introduced in the previous section measure the typical influence of
an article in i over journal j. In each method, every journal i is viewed as an initial
creator of knowledge, where the unit of knowledge created is a typical article in i.
There are two important flaws with this interpretation. First, it assumes that journals
use no inputs: this approach would be suitable in a world where each article would be
100% original and would not draw on any pre-existing insights; even if such a world
would exist, then we would have an inconsistency because if all articles are entirely
original there are no citations made. Second, if articles can be split or merged, an
article is surely not the the most elementary building block of a journal. This problem
has been previously addressed by counting journal pages, or – given that pages can
be very different in size – even characters. Mirrlees et al (2003) is an excellent survey
of empiric works that use such approaches. However, the character length is natural
to measure the length of an essay, but not papers, especially in a field so diverse as
economics.
Theorem 1 together with the discussion above are not just criticizing the most
used ranking methods, but they are also instructive about where to improve. In the
following, we will define modified methods that are invariant to article-splitting. First,
we view a journal as an intermediary that adds value when converting inputs (citations
made) into outputs (citations received). Interpreting a journal as an intermediary
is new. In spirit, this idea is related to the stream of research in the management
literature that focuses on measuring the value of intangible assets (for instance, human
capital in a consultancy company): since a direct measurement is impossible, the
ability of these intangible assets to convert inputs into outputs is often taken as
7The exact algorithms used by search engines are both a moving target and a black box, but
the characteristics to which we make the analogy to here are known to be relatively stable (see for
example Langville and Meyer (2006)).
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proxy for their value. Similarly, we proxy the creation of new knowledge by a journal’s
ability to convert inputs into outputs. Second, we consider the smallest indivisible
unit of knowledge to be a citation. Thus, we take the number of citations made as
the footprint of an article and of a journal, and we value those articles more that can
make the most of the same borrowed knowledge. Formally, we define:
Definition 9. The modified impact factor gives valuations according to v that solves
D−1C Ce = v (12)
where e is a vector of ones of dimension J and the matrices DC and C contain data
for a two-year period.
Definition 10. The modified LP method gives valuations according to v that solves
D−1C Cv
||D−1C Cv||
= v. (13)
Definition 11. The modified invariant method gives valuations according to v that
solves
D−1C CD
−1
C DCv = v. (14)
The invariant method simplifies to D−1C Cv = v. Since the matrix D
−1
C C is normalized
we have the following remark.
Remark 1. The modified invariant and modified LP methods coincide.
5 Rankings of Economic Journals
In this section we provide scores and rankings for economic journals.
5.1 Data
Our data is based on the category “Economics” in the Journal Citation Reports (JCR)
of Thompson-Reuters. We have ignored citations to and from journals outside this
category. The data is published annually with a one year lag: edition t appears in
year t + 1 and contains data about publications that appeared in t. Our data is for
the editions from 2002 to 2010.
From this data, we excluded (1) “ghost” journals, i.e., journals for which the sum
of citations made and received is at most 2, (2) “dead” journals that do not make
citations in a given year and (3) new journals, i.e., journals that only appear in latest
edition of the data. Following this approach, we obtained a set of 224 journals that
make or receive citations and that appeared in at least two years of our data.
Notice that an article published in a journal in year t may make citations to
articles published in any year t′, t′ ≤ t. In particular, some relatively old articles
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had a persistent impact, and receive an important number of citations even many
years after their publication. However, we are interested in the current quality of
economic journals. Thus, we ignore citations to old articles as follows: for each year
t ∈ {2006, . . . 2010}, we generate matrices of citations Ct, where an entry ctij is the
total number of citations made by j in year t to articles published in i in all years t′,
such that t− t′ ≤ 4. That is, to compute the scores for 2010, we used only citations
made by articles published in 2010 to articles that appeared between 2006 and 2010
inclusive.
For completeness, in Appendix B we include a description of how we formatted
the data for input, and we provide the source code that we used for our computations.
5.2 The Influence of Economic Journals
In Table 1, for the top 30 journals, we present the development of the modified
invariant scores over the last 5 years. To ease the comparison, we use normalized
vectors: scores are given in percents. The complete table with the full set of 224
journals is presented in Appendix A.
Table 1: Modified invariant scores (sc) and ranks (r) of
economic journals, 2006–2010.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Journal sc r sc r sc r sc r sc r
Econometrica 6.62 1 4.94 2 5.56 2 4.13 2 4.51 1
J Polit Econ 6.31 2 12.41 1 5.59 1 4.77 1 4.17 2
Q J Econ 5.09 3 3.99 3 4.27 3 3.83 3 4.10 3
Rev Econ Stud 3.12 5 3.47 5 3.16 4 3.17 5 2.83 4
Am Econ Rev 2.62 6 3.37 6 2.83 5 3.00 7 2.81 5
J Labor Econ 2.07 10 1.77 12 2.77 6 1.79 14 2.56 6
J Financ - - - - - - 3.21 4 2.55 7
J Law Econ Organ 1.28 22 3.07 7 0.77 37 0.76 40 2.34 8
Rand J Econ 1.97 11 0.95 28 1.41 17 3.11 6 2.32 9
J Law Econ 1.28 21 3.86 4 0.50 53 0.80 38 2.24 10
Rev Econ Stat 2.35 7 2.07 9 2.51 7 1.94 13 1.95 11
Math Financ 1.12 25 0.66 41 1.37 20 0.92 30 1.89 12
J Econ Perspect 1.64 15 1.42 14 2.23 10 2.63 8 1.85 13
J Econ Theory 4.27 4 1.32 15 2.34 8 1.54 16 1.71 14
J Econometrics 1.04 27 1.01 25 0.77 36 2.01 11 1.68 15
Int J Game Theory 0.38 69 0.38 60 0.22 94 1.65 15 1.66 16
Econ Theor 1.04 28 0.94 29 1.23 23 1.50 17 1.63 17
J Financ Econ 2.30 9 1.16 20 2.34 9 2.36 9 1.59 18
Int Econ Rev 2.32 8 1.60 13 2.03 12 1.04 27 1.58 19
...
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Journal sc r sc r sc r sc r sc r
J Eur Econ Assoc - - 1.88 11 1.67 15 1.18 22 1.55 20
J Monetary Econ 1.68 14 0.88 32 1.12 26 1.31 21 1.54 21
Soc Choice Welfare 0.53 52 0.71 38 0.43 56 0.75 41 1.46 22
Exp Econ 0.50 53 1.11 23 0.68 41 1.09 24 1.40 23
J Bus Econ Stat 1.37 19 0.80 35 1.85 14 0.65 45 1.35 24
J Hum Resour 0.80 38 1.14 21 1.05 27 1.41 20 1.33 25
J Int Econ 1.02 30 1.10 24 0.94 31 0.90 32 1.21 26
Brookings P Eco Ac 1.11 26 0.99 26 1.88 13 1.43 19 1.19 27
J Ind Econ 1.37 18 0.91 30 0.74 39 0.90 32 1.18 28
Game Econ Behav 1.92 13 2.34 8 1.41 18 1.13 23 1.18 29
J Econ Growth 0.54 49 1.93 10 2.21 11 1.04 26 1.11 30
For the most recent results of 2010, the modified invariant method ranks high
journals such as IJGT or Social Choice and Welfare. These are rather formal journals
that require relatively little input and are very efficient in converting inputs into
outputs. In contrast, the modified invariant method ranks less high journals such
as Brookings Papers on Economic Activity or the Journal of Economic Literature.
These journals naturally require extensive reviews of the literature. Given the sheer
number of inputs needed, these journals are less efficient in converting inputs into
outputs.
We also note the excellent results obtained in 2010 by the Journal of Law, Eco-
nomics and Organization (JLEO). This was particularly surprising since this journal
rather falls in the category of journals that require extensive reviews of the literature.
A close inspection reveals that despite making a relatively high number of citations,
only a fraction of these citations are towards other journals that are included in our
dataset, i.e., an important number of cites are to law and management journals.
Thus, for our method, this journal appears to consume less information than it actu-
ally does. A similar observation applies for the Mathematical Finance (MF), a journal
that has an important fraction of citations to journals in mathematics and statistics.
On the other hand, JLEO and MF receive a lot of attention from other journals in
economics. It seems that both these journals are very efficient in converting input
from other disciplines to economics.
When we look at the trends in the intellectual influence of economic journals, while
we see a slight permutation in the rankings, the top five remained relatively stable
between 2006 and 2010. The same cannot be said about all other journals. Over
the years studied, the International Journal of Game Theory (IJGT) has made a
remarkable progress, overtaking even Games and Economic Behavior (GEB), widely
considered a top journal. While one can only speculate about the reasons of these
changes, favorable editorial policies expanding the journal’s scope into niche segments
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on the one side, and an increasing competition from among others the newly launched
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics on the other, may have contributed to
these developments.
The Journal of Finance was continuously published since 1946. However, our
dataset only contains enough information to provide results for this journal for two
years. As we are unsure about why the dataset is incomplete, we are cautious in
interpreting the scores for this journal.
We also note that all scores and rankings based on eigenvector methods, irrespec-
tive of whether these methods are modified or unmodified, are inherently volatile.
We could reduce the volatility by increasing the difference t − t′, but this would be
against our scope of providing current, as opposed to historical, scores. Another
way to reduce the volatility would be to introduce correction factors. If the citation
matrix would have dangling nodes, i.e., journals that only receive but do not make
citations, one could introduce a correction factor that allows with some probability to
“escape” from the dangling node. In principle this technique can be extended even for
matrices such as ours where all journals make citations to smoothen out the scores.
However, since there is a trade off between introducing noise and smoothening scores,
calibrating the correction factor would be of paramount importance.
5.3 Other Scores and Rankings
In this subsection, we discuss some other scores and rankings that are sometimes
used.
Thomson Reuters publishes an impact factor score (see Definition 3) for journals.
This is the score displayed on the webpages of journals at major publishers. Research
Papers in Economics (RePEc) is the largest bibliographical database in Economics,
covering most journals and working papers. RePEc provides a number of alternative
scores based on a time unrestricted impact factor (Zimmermann, 2007).
Recall that for the impact factor, there is no distinction if a citation is received
from a prestigious journal or from a mediocre one, i.e., all citations have equal weight.
Furthermore, the impact factor is just an average. It is known to vary greatly across
and even within fields due to, for instance, differences in citation habits and field
size (Jemec, 2001). Moreover, it is so easily manipulable that in 2007, as a form of
protest against it’s usage, the editorial board of a medical journal agreed to publish
one article that alone boosted it’s impact factor from 0.66 to 1.44 (Opa´trny´, 2008).
Despite this protest, in 2008, the journal Acta Crystallographica Section A ranked
second in Thomson Reuter’s science category, ahead of journals such as Nature or
Science, after publishing one article in which the authors suggested that their work
can be used as a general reference for an emerging field. Overall, the limitations by
definition and the forms of potential and real manipulation (Smith, 1997) make the
impact factor a very unreliable indicator of quality.
Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) characterized the invariant method and provided
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rankings of economic journals using different methods. In their rankings, Palacios-
Huerta and Volij (2004) used a subset of 37 journals and in their Ct matrix they
allowed for any t′ such that t− t′ ≤ 6. However, note that Palacios-Huerta and Volij
(2004) are only interested in illustrating the differences between the methods they
consider. Thus, for simplicity and to ease the computations, it was natural for them
to restrict their attention to a small arbitrary subset of journals. Their results are
not meant to reflect the intellectual influence of economic journals.
The EigenFactor (Bergstrom, 2007; Bergstrom et al, 2008) and the SCImago
(Gonza´lez-Pereira et al, 2009) are two independent projects that are worth mentioning
as real contributions towards the understanding of the influence of journals. Based
on data from Thomson Reuters and Elsevier’s Scopus respectively8, both projects
essentially use fine-tuned invariant methods to obtain scores and rankings for jour-
nals. Despite the fact that the methodology in both projects is subject to the same
critiques as the invariant method, these projects represent a major improvement over
the impact factor.
Finally, we note that the tournament method (Ko´czy and Strobel, 2010) is invari-
ant to article-splitting by definition, and that for the h index (Hirsch, 2004; Braun
et al, 2006) article splitting has an ambiguous effect.
6 Conclusion
This paper is part of a broader program that aims at the better understanding of
scoring methods. Ko´czy and Strobel (2008) have shown that adding unnecessary
citations may be a means of manipulation, here we look at an issue of journal design:
the length of the articles.
First, we introduced and formalized a desirable property and we derived analyti-
cally that the popular methods for ranking academic journals are inherently biased.
For journals with similar citation patterns, the journals publishing fewer articles are
privileged to the ones publishing more articles. If we account for the length of a
journal based on the number of pages or characters, then the current scoring meth-
ods give extra credit to shorter more formal journals and punish those that make an
effort of keeping good English in their articles. Thus, the currently most used scoring
methods share a common drawback: they cannot distinguish quality from quantity at
article level. Furthermore, observe that for a journal with relatively numerous articles
but few pages, measuring its influence by taking the number of pages or articles as
input will make a crucial difference. One must therefore use and interpret the valua-
tions and the induced rankings with care when estimating the quality of journals and
articles.
A direct consequence of our theoretical results is that the current methods for
8Unfortunately, for the time being, metrics based on automatically identified citations using
Google Scholar or RePEc just add one more layer of uncertainty, namely collecting genuine citations.
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measuring influence are manipulable, and that strategies that increase the payoffs are
relatively easy to infer and implement. This is a concern for the evaluation of research
and in closely related settings like raking web domains. An interesting open question
is to quantify the incentive to manipulate by considering the maximum number of
ranks someone can gain in their preference ordering by manipulation or the number
of ranks someone else can lose due to manipulation, as it has recently been done by
(Campbell and Kelly, 2009, 2010) for social choice settings.
Second, we introduced a modification of the current scoring methods which ren-
ders them immune to the bias and which, as opposed to other modifications suggested
in the earlier literature, still preserves the notion of value at article level. This modi-
fication has also a novel interpretation, and it is more appropriate for measuring the
creation of knowledge.
Third, using our modified invariant method, we have conducted a worldwide rank-
ing of journals in economics, over the period 2006-2010.
Appendix
A The complete ranking of economics journals
Table 2: Modified invariant scores (sc) and ranks (r) of economic
journals, 2006–2010.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Journal sc r sc r sc r sc r sc r
Econometrica 6.62 1 4.94 2 5.56 2 4.13 2 4.51 1
J Polit Econ 6.31 2 12.41 1 5.59 1 4.77 1 4.17 2
Q J Econ 5.09 3 3.99 3 4.27 3 3.83 3 4.10 3
Rev Econ Stud 3.12 5 3.47 5 3.16 4 3.17 5 2.83 4
Am Econ Rev 2.62 6 3.37 6 2.83 5 3.00 7 2.81 5
J Labor Econ 2.07 10 1.77 12 2.77 6 1.79 14 2.56 6
J Financ - - - - - - 3.21 4 2.55 7
J Law Econ Organ 1.28 22 3.07 7 0.77 37 0.76 40 2.34 8
Rand J Econ 1.97 11 0.95 28 1.41 17 3.11 6 2.32 9
J Law Econ 1.28 21 3.86 4 0.50 53 0.80 38 2.24 10
Rev Econ Stat 2.35 7 2.07 9 2.51 7 1.94 13 1.95 11
Math Financ 1.12 25 0.66 41 1.37 20 0.92 30 1.89 12
J Econ Perspect 1.64 15 1.42 14 2.23 10 2.63 8 1.85 13
J Econ Theory 4.27 4 1.32 15 2.34 8 1.54 16 1.71 14
J Econometrics 1.04 27 1.01 25 0.77 36 2.01 11 1.68 15
Int J Game Theory 0.38 69 0.38 60 0.22 94 1.65 15 1.66 16
Econ Theor 1.04 28 0.94 29 1.23 23 1.50 17 1.63 17
J Financ Econ 2.30 9 1.16 20 2.34 9 2.36 9 1.59 18
Int Econ Rev 2.32 8 1.60 13 2.03 12 1.04 27 1.58 19
J Eur Econ Assoc - - 1.88 11 1.67 15 1.18 22 1.55 20
...
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Journal sc r sc r sc r sc r sc r
J Monetary Econ 1.68 14 0.88 32 1.12 26 1.31 21 1.54 21
Soc Choice Welfare 0.53 52 0.71 38 0.43 56 0.75 41 1.46 22
Exp Econ 0.50 53 1.11 23 0.68 41 1.09 24 1.40 23
J Bus Econ Stat 1.37 19 0.80 35 1.85 14 0.65 45 1.35 24
J Hum Resour 0.80 38 1.14 21 1.05 27 1.41 20 1.33 25
J Int Econ 1.02 30 1.10 24 0.94 31 0.90 32 1.21 26
Brookings P Econ Ac 1.11 26 0.99 26 1.88 13 1.43 19 1.19 27
J Ind Econ 1.37 18 0.91 30 0.74 39 0.90 32 1.18 28
Game Econ Behav 1.92 13 2.34 8 1.41 18 1.13 23 1.18 29
J Econ Growth 0.54 49 1.93 10 2.21 11 1.04 26 1.11 30
Economet Theor 1.01 32 1.13 22 1.02 28 0.93 29 1.09 31
Economica 0.67 43 0.35 64 0.30 75 0.53 55 0.97 32
Econ Philos 1.03 29 0.15 102 0.05 167 0.08 156 0.93 33
J Public Econ 1.19 23 1.18 19 0.88 32 0.80 37 0.90 34
IMF Staff Papers 0.23 84 0.34 67 0.60 48 0.12 128 0.88 35
Econ J 1.30 20 0.82 34 0.95 30 0.88 33 0.87 36
J Financ Economet - - - - - - 1.03 28 0.83 37
Rev Econ Dynam 1.38 17 1.31 16 1.38 19 1.97 12 0.82 38
Economet Rev - - 0.33 68 0.74 39 2.29 10 0.79 39
J Dev Econ 0.67 44 0.79 36 1.18 25 0.72 43 0.73 40
Economet J - - 0.62 43 0.34 71 0.26 79 0.71 41
J Econ Lit 1.39 16 1.18 19 1.35 21 0.56 53 0.71 42
J Money Credit Bank 0.37 71 0.38 58 1.23 22 0.70 44 0.70 43
Quant Mark Econ - - - - 0.43 55 0.08 154 0.66 44
J Appl Economet - - - - - - 0.85 36 0.65 45
J Account Econ 1.93 12 0.97 27 0.77 35 1.43 19 0.65 46
J Econ Hist 0.63 46 1.25 17 1.62 16 0.74 42 0.64 47
J Econ Manage Strat 0.87 35 0.51 49 0.66 44 0.34 67 0.64 48
Int J Ind Organ 0.59 48 0.37 61 0.45 54 0.87 34 0.62 49
Eur Econ Rev 0.85 37 0.54 47 0.82 34 0.64 47 0.62 50
J Urban Econ 0.71 42 0.74 37 0.32 74 0.77 39 0.57 51
Econ Policy 0.44 62 0.31 71 0.58 51 0.35 65 0.56 52
J Financ Quant Anal 1.02 31 0.85 33 0.98 29 0.87 35 0.50 54
Econ Hist Rev 0.32 75 0.17 95 0.59 49 0.34 69 0.50 54
Theor Decis 0.21 85 0.24 77 0.32 73 1.05 25 0.50 55
Econ Inq 0.45 61 0.62 43 0.70 40 0.57 51 0.49 56
Econ Dev Cult Change 0.13 108 0.43 54 0.40 62 0.43 61 0.47 57
Econ Lett 0.61 47 0.67 39 0.34 69 0.60 48 0.46 58
J Risk Uncertainty 0.87 34 0.53 48 0.66 43 0.39 62 0.46 59
J Health Econ 0.54 51 0.35 65 0.42 59 0.34 66 0.45 60
Scand J Econ 0.77 40 0.43 53 0.65 45 0.25 82 0.42 61
J Env Econ Manag 0.48 56 0.48 51 0.36 66 0.34 69 0.41 62
J Econ Educ 0.18 93 0.06 147 0.38 64 0.07 163 0.39 63
Public Choice 0.25 81 0.22 81 0.28 80 0.19 99 0.39 64
Can J Econ 0.33 73 0.23 78 0.29 77 0.27 75 0.37 65
J Math Econ 0.77 39 0.60 45 0.63 47 0.58 50 0.34 66
World Bank Econ Rev 0.26 77 0.60 44 0.55 52 0.56 54 0.34 67
...
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Journal sc r sc r sc r sc r sc r
J Econ Behav Organ 0.50 54 0.89 31 0.40 63 0.38 63 0.33 68
Econ Educ Rev 0.49 55 0.32 70 0.59 50 0.24 84 0.33 69
J Risk Insur 0.26 79 0.23 79 0.17 100 0.17 103 0.32 70
Explor Econ Hist 0.40 64 0.40 57 1.21 24 0.13 121 0.31 71
J Jpn Int Econ 0.08 123 0.21 85 0.16 105 0.11 133 0.30 72
J Public Econ Theory - - - - - - 0.25 81 0.30 73
Oxford B Econ Stat 0.19 89 0.36 63 0.32 72 0.49 58 0.29 74
Econ Soc 0.18 91 0.10 123 0.06 146 0.10 137 0.29 75
J Policy Anal Manag - - 0.08 131 0.28 79 0.29 73 0.28 77
Indep Rev - - 0.10 121 0.09 135 0.01 209 0.28 77
J Econ Dyn Control 0.48 58 0.41 56 0.34 70 0.45 59 0.28 78
Eur Rev Econ Hist - - - - - - 0.26 78 0.27 79
Rev Env Econ Policy - - - - - - 0.04 185 0.27 80
Macroecon Dyn 0.36 72 0.32 69 0.28 81 0.13 125 0.25 81
Econ J Watch - - - - - - 0.04 182 0.24 82
Fisc Stud 0.14 102 0.04 160 0.10 131 0.23 91 0.24 83
Natl Tax J 0.86 36 0.18 89 0.64 46 0.29 74 0.24 84
Quant Financ 0.64 45 0.31 72 0.17 101 0.18 101 0.23 85
J Popul Econ 0.26 78 0.38 59 0.41 61 0.65 46 0.23 86
J Transp Econ Policy 0.11 116 0.27 74 0.16 104 0.60 49 0.22 87
Fem Econ 0.06 131 0.05 150 0.01 183 0.09 149 0.22 89
Oxford Econ Pap 0.47 60 0.49 50 0.87 33 0.24 89 0.22 89
Int Tax Public Finan 0.48 57 0.29 73 0.27 82 0.24 86 0.22 90
Reg Sci Urban Econ 0.15 99 0.46 52 0.37 65 0.16 107 0.21 91
J Econ Geogr 0.40 67 0.09 128 0.24 89 0.16 108 0.21 92
Labour Econ 0.43 63 0.34 66 0.21 95 0.31 72 0.21 93
Real Estate Econ 1.15 24 0.04 157 0.17 103 0.36 64 0.20 95
South Econ J 0.16 96 0.18 90 0.25 87 0.16 107 0.20 95
Small Bus Econ 0.06 134 0.21 84 0.08 139 0.10 141 0.19 96
Am J Agr Econ 0.13 103 0.22 83 0.24 92 0.15 113 0.19 97
J Macroecon 0.12 115 0.08 133 0.09 137 0.11 131 0.19 98
Econ Dev Q 0.03 148 0.67 40 0.00 194 0.04 184 0.19 99
Rev Dev Econ - - 0.11 120 0.13 114 0.21 94 0.17 100
J Real Estate Financ 0.48 59 0.07 138 0.21 96 0.15 111 0.17 102
Health Econ 0.19 90 0.13 111 0.41 60 0.27 76 0.17 102
Am J Econ Sociol 0.01 153 0.15 103 0.08 142 0.19 98 0.17 103
Int J Forecasting 0.40 66 0.12 114 0.11 123 0.09 145 0.16 104
Oxford Rev Econ Pol 0.15 99 0.22 80 0.23 93 0.15 109 0.16 105
Jpn Econ Rev 0.08 124 0.20 87 0.35 68 0.02 194 0.16 106
Fed Reserve Bank St - - - - 0.43 57 0.22 93 0.15 107
Appl Econ 0.05 135 0.10 124 0.13 117 0.13 121 0.15 108
Jpn World Econ 0.17 94 0.24 76 0.05 167 0.02 201 0.15 111
Empir Econ - - 0.13 109 0.13 112 0.13 124 0.15 111
J Econ Psychol 0.38 70 0.16 99 0.17 99 0.11 132 0.15 111
J Comp Econ 0.12 113 0.18 93 0.18 98 0.11 135 0.15 114
Int Rev Law Econ 0.96 33 0.08 136 0.16 106 0.17 104 0.15 114
Camb J Econ - - 0.12 117 0.08 141 0.06 167 0.15 114
...
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Journal sc r sc r sc r sc r sc r
J Prod Anal 0.24 82 0.16 98 0.17 102 0.14 117 0.15 115
Astin Bull - - 0.08 135 0.12 118 0.26 77 0.15 117
World Dev 0.12 110 0.12 116 0.15 107 0.12 129 0.15 117
J Common Mark S 0.08 122 0.43 55 0.35 67 0.05 178 0.14 118
Insur Math Econ 0.40 66 0.13 109 0.13 117 0.15 110 0.14 119
J Bank Financ 0.20 86 0.20 86 0.24 91 0.18 100 0.13 120
J Regul Econ 0.54 50 0.09 127 0.29 76 0.45 60 0.13 121
Rev Income Wealth 0.33 74 0.18 91 0.42 58 0.24 88 0.13 122
Energ J 0.13 104 0.16 98 0.24 90 0.56 53 0.13 123
Stud Nonlinear Dyn E 0.32 76 0.13 112 0.05 167 0.09 147 0.12 124
Be J Macroecon - - - - - - 0.07 163 0.12 125
World Bank Res Obser 0.13 107 0.55 46 0.26 84 0.04 179 0.12 126
Land Econ 0.26 80 0.22 82 0.18 97 0.23 90 0.11 128
Rev Ind Organ 0.16 97 0.36 63 0.06 149 0.22 92 0.11 128
World Econ 0.13 107 0.14 107 0.25 88 0.17 103 0.11 130
Agr Econ-Blackwell - - 0.04 155 0.09 138 0.05 177 0.11 130
Ger Econ Rev - - - - - - 0.05 176 0.11 131
Pac Econ Rev - - 0.02 166 0.04 173 0.03 193 0.11 132
Pharmacoeconomics - - - - - - 0.03 190 0.11 133
Be J Econ Anal Poli - - - - - - 0.13 123 0.11 134
J Evol Econ 0.11 117 0.17 94 0.12 120 0.09 146 0.10 136
J Econ Issues 0.01 155 0.04 155 0.03 175 0.01 209 0.10 136
Value Health - - - - - - 0.01 205 0.10 137
Europe-Asia Stud 0.02 151 0.17 96 0.00 188 0.01 211 0.09 138
Aust Econ Hist Rev - - - - 0.66 42 0.51 57 0.09 140
Rev World Econ 0.00 158 0.07 142 0.10 127 0.14 117 0.09 140
Environ Resour Econ 0.19 88 0.12 116 0.12 119 0.20 96 0.09 142
Contemp Econ Policy 0.06 129 0.12 113 0.09 133 0.15 112 0.09 142
J Inst Theor Econ 0.19 88 0.09 125 0.26 85 0.34 70 0.08 143
Economist-Netherland 0.06 132 0.01 169 0.06 152 0.04 182 0.08 146
Scot J Polit Econ 0.23 83 0.10 123 0.05 159 0.13 122 0.08 146
J Forest Econ - - 0.04 161 0.05 159 0.10 140 0.08 146
J Afr Econ 0.04 139 0.05 152 0.09 137 0.12 128 0.08 147
Resour Energy Econ 0.14 101 0.26 75 0.09 133 0.25 83 0.08 148
Cesifo Econ Stud - - 0.04 157 0.05 167 0.07 157 0.08 149
Asian Econ Policy R - - - - - - 0.03 187 0.07 150
J Sport Econ - - - - - - 0.21 95 0.07 151
Ecol Econ 0.04 141 0.05 153 0.06 149 0.11 134 0.07 152
Eur Rev Agric Econ 0.03 146 0.03 164 0.06 153 0.05 174 0.07 153
J Policy Model 0.05 138 0.08 133 0.04 169 0.09 152 0.06 155
J Dev Stud 0.12 113 0.19 88 0.11 124 0.14 114 0.06 155
Econ Transit 0.08 126 0.13 111 0.14 109 0.14 118 0.06 159
Kyklos 0.07 127 0.14 105 0.12 121 0.07 159 0.06 159
Econ Rec 0.09 121 0.06 144 0.08 141 0.10 136 0.06 159
Aust J Agr Resour Ec 0.03 142 0.09 127 0.07 143 0.09 144 0.06 159
J Cult Econ - - - - - - 0.06 170 0.06 161
Eur J Health Econ - - - - - - 0.07 159 0.06 161
...
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Journal sc r sc r sc r sc r sc r
Finanzarchiv - - - - 0.14 109 0.05 174 0.06 164
Econ Hum Biol - - - - 0.28 78 0.10 140 0.06 164
Energ Econ 0.18 93 0.18 92 0.05 162 0.19 97 0.06 164
J Econ 0.39 68 0.08 131 0.25 86 0.09 149 0.06 167
Inf Econ Policy 0.13 107 0.05 150 0.13 117 0.51 56 0.06 167
Appl Econ Lett 0.06 130 0.07 139 0.10 131 0.10 142 0.06 167
J Real Estate Res - - - - 0.06 155 0.09 152 0.05 168
J Agr Resour Econ 0.04 140 0.06 148 0.06 145 0.08 155 0.05 171
Mar Resour Econ - - - - - - 0.10 138 0.05 171
Hist Polit Econ - - - - 0.04 170 0.07 160 0.05 171
J Econ Surv 0.06 129 0.12 118 0.14 111 0.12 130 0.05 172
J Hous Econ 0.72 41 0.06 146 0.14 110 0.05 174 0.05 173
Be J Theor Econ - - - - - - 0.24 88 0.05 175
J Int Trade Econ Dev - - - - - - 0.05 176 0.05 175
Food Policy 0.03 144 0.07 142 0.06 147 0.07 161 0.05 176
J Agr Econ 0.05 136 0.02 167 0.06 152 0.04 184 0.05 177
Manch Sch 0.14 100 0.15 100 0.07 144 0.16 105 0.04 178
Work Employ Soc 0.00 158 0.01 171 0.04 172 0.06 168 0.04 179
Asian Econ J - - - - - - 0.05 171 0.04 181
Can J Agr Econ - - - - 0.05 156 0.06 166 0.04 181
J Regional Sci - - 0.14 104 0.10 129 0.14 119 0.04 182
Dev Econ 0.01 156 0.07 142 0.02 181 0.01 212 0.04 183
Int J Transp Econ - - 0.08 137 0.00 194 0.00 224 0.04 184
Open Econ Rev 0.12 114 0.01 169 0.09 135 0.09 152 0.04 185
Econ Model 0.10 118 0.08 135 0.05 168 0.02 199 0.03 187
Ind Corp Change 0.17 95 0.04 160 0.13 113 0.09 143 0.03 187
S Afr J Econ 0.06 134 0.01 172 0.04 171 0.02 196 0.03 188
Int Financ - - - - - - 0.25 81 0.03 191
Jahrb Natl Stat 0.01 154 - - 0.02 180 0.01 213 0.03 191
Rev Int Polit Econ 0.12 110 0.08 129 0.27 83 0.06 166 0.03 191
J Post Keynesian Ec 0.05 137 0.06 145 0.05 157 0.04 186 0.03 192
J Media Econ 0.00 162 0.00 179 0.00 188 0.03 191 0.03 194
China Econ Rev 0.08 125 0.11 120 0.05 162 0.02 195 0.03 194
Econ Geogr 0.12 111 0.05 152 0.11 122 0.03 192 0.02 195
Aust Econ Pap - - - - - - 0.06 170 0.02 196
New Polit Econ 0.03 149 0.04 158 0.05 162 0.01 204 0.02 197
Emerg Mark Financ Tr 0.02 152 0.01 174 0.10 128 0.02 203 0.02 199
Post-Sov Aff 0.03 145 0.14 106 0.01 182 0.01 210 0.02 199
Aust Econ Rev - - - - 0.03 178 0.06 166 0.02 200
China World Econ - - - - 0.00 189 0.02 200 0.02 202
Futures 0.03 148 0.07 143 0.10 127 0.02 203 0.02 202
Eur J Hist Econ Thou - - 0.03 164 0.03 175 0.32 71 0.01 204
Tijdschr Econ Soc Ge 0.09 120 0.03 165 0.10 125 0.03 189 0.01 204
J Agrar Change - - - - 0.05 167 0.24 85 0.01 206
J Appl Econ - - 0.01 173 0.03 176 0.12 126 0.01 206
J Asia Pac Econ - - - - - - 0.03 189 0.01 207
Asian-Pac Econ Lit - - - - - - 0.04 182 0.01 210
...
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Journal sc r sc r sc r sc r sc r
Defence Peace Econ 0.09 119 0.15 101 0.06 154 0.08 153 0.01 210
Port Econ J - - 0.01 170 0.03 178 0.14 117 0.01 210
Post-Communist Econ 0.00 159 0.03 162 0.01 186 0.02 199 0.00 211
Eastern Eur Econ 0.03 143 0.01 175 0.02 180 0.01 209 0.00 213
Singap Econ Rev - - - - - - 0.02 199 0.00 213
Cepal Rev - - - - - - 0.01 209 0.00 224
Ekon Cas 0.00 160 - - 0.00 194 0.00 224 0.00 224
Invest Econ-Mex - - - - - - 0.01 214 0.00 224
J Bus Econ Manag - - - - - - 0.00 224 0.00 224
Polit Ekon 0.02 150 0.00 179 0.00 190 0.00 224 0.00 224
Rev Econ Apl-Spain - - - - 0.06 152 0.00 216 0.00 224
Rev Econ Mund - - - - - - 0.00 224 0.00 224
Rev Econ Polit - - 0.00 179 0.00 194 0.00 224 0.00 224
S Afr J Econ Manag S - - - - 0.01 186 0.00 217 0.00 224
Transform Bus Econ - - - - - - 0.00 224 0.00 224
Trimest Econ 0.00 162 0.00 179 0.01 184 0.00 215 0.00 224
B Data Format and Source Code
We organized the data in three types of files:
• the m file – in this file, for each year t, there is a spreadsheet containing the
citation matrix Ct where an entry in row i, column j is the total number of
cites made in year t by articles in journal j to articles in journal i no older than
4 years;
• the a file – in this file, for each year t, there is a spreadsheet containing a column
with the number of articles a published by each journal in that year;
• the c file – in this file, for each year t, there is a spreadsheet containing a column
with the total number of citations cj made by journal j to articles in journals
in J no older than 4 years.
To obtain the raw ranking vectors from the above matrices, we used the following
code in Wolfram Mathematica 8.0:
LP = {Null, Null, Null, Null, Null};
Inv = {Null, Null, Null, Null, Null};
ModInv = {Null, Null, Null, Null, Null};
For[i = 1, i <= 5, i++;
Cnow = Import["data/m.xls"][[i]];
Anow = DiagonalMatrix[Transpose[Import["data/a.xls"][[i]] ][[1]]];
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DCnow = DiagonalMatrix[Transpose[Import["data/c.xls"][[i]] ][[1]]];
LP[[i]] = Eigenvectors[Inverse[Anow].Cnow][[1]];
Inv[[i]] = Eigenvectors[Inverse[Anow].Cnow.Inverse[DCnow].Anow][[1]];
ModInv[[i]] = Eigenvectors[Inverse[DCnow].Cnow][[1]]];
Export["lp.xls", LP];
Export["inv.xls", Inv];
Export["modinv.xls", ModInv]
The diagonal matrices A and DC are generated by our code from the data files. Each
year we have a different set of journals: for each year the raw score vectors are copied
next to the lists of journals and are normalized. The overall ranking is produced by
sorting the journals according to their scores.
C Detailed Calculations
Writing Equality 7 in detail for the left most and right most terms of the equality, we
obtain the following system of equations:
1
a1
[(v1c11 + · · ·+ vnc1n)− (x1c11 + · · ·+ xj−1c1j−1 + xj+1c1j+1 + · · ·+ xnc1n)] =
= 1
a1
(v1c11 + · · ·+ vnc1n)− δv1 − %(Γ′)x1
...
1
a′j
[(v1cj1 + · · ·+ vncjn)− (x1cj1 + · · ·+ xj−1cjj−1 + xj+1cjj+1 + · · ·+ xncjn)] =
= 1
aj
(v1cj1 + · · ·+ vncjn)− δvj − %(Γ′)xj
...
1
an
[(v1cn1 + · · ·+ vncnn)− (x1cn1 + · · ·+ xj−1cnj−1 + xj+1cnj+1 + · · ·+ xncnn)] =
= 1
an
(v1cn1 + · · ·+ vncnn)− δvn − %(Γ′)xn
After canceling terms and dropping the j’th row from the system of equations
above, we obtain:
1
a1
(x1c11 + · · ·+ xj−1c1j−1 + xj+1c1j+1 + · · ·+ xnc1n) = δv1 + %(Γ′)x1
...
1
aj−1
(x1cj−11 + · · ·+ xj−1cj−1j−1 + xj+1cj−1j+1 + · · ·+ xncj−1n) = δvj−1 + %(Γ′)xj−1
1
aj+1
(x1cj+11 + · · ·+ xj−1cj+1j−1 + xj+1cj+1j+1 + · · ·+ xncj+1n) = δvj+1 + %(Γ′)xj+1
...
1
an
(x1cn1 + · · ·+ xj−1cnj−1 + xj+1cnj+1 + · · ·+ xncnn) = δvn + %(Γ′)xn
Rewriting the above system of equations using vector and matrix notation yields
Equation 8.
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